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THE SUN SETS ON TAMUZ 1: THE ISRAELI RAID ON
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR REACTOR
On Sunday, June 7, 1981, eight F-16 fighter-bombers and six
F-15 interceptors' flew eastward over Jordan, Saudi Arabia and
Iraq.2 Shortly after 6:30 p.m., Baghdad time,3 each F-16 dropped
two 2,000-pound bombs4 over a nuclear installation near Baghdad,
Iraq.5 Within two minutes,6 the operation was completed with
"brilliant surgical precision." 7 Tamuz 1, the target of the attack,
was demolished.8
The Israeli government immediately claimed responsibility for
the destruction of Tamuz 1.9 Menachem Begin, Israel's Prime MinI. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 1. The F-16 is designed for "[a]ir superiority," and has a secondary role of interdiction. This aircraft was created by General Dynamics (a United States company) and holds a crew of one. The F-16 has a length of 14.32
meters, a wingspan of 9.14 meters, and an empty weight of 6330 kilograms. See NATIONAL
STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC., ARMS, MEN AND MILITARY BUDGETS 176-77

(1976). The principal role of the F-15 is "[interception/air superiority," with a secondary
purpose of interdiction. This aircraft, which was designed in the United States by McDonnell Douglas, also holds a crew of one. The length of the F-15 is 19.5 meters, the wingspan is
13.1 meters, and the empty weight is 11860 kilograms. Id
2. The IsraeliAirStrike: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm on Foreign Relations, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981) (statement of Sen. Charles Percy) [hereinafter cited as Hearings.:
IsraeliAir Strike].
3. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 8, col. 5.
4. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 3. See also Two Minutes Over Baghdad,
NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1981, at 23.
5. Warren Donnelly of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, submitted a report on behalf of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. This account is entitled The IsraeliRaid into Iraq and was included in the materials for Hearings:
IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 68 [hereinafter cited as Donnelly].
6. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 4.
7. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 213 (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos).
Reconnaissance photos revealed an absence of craters in the vicinity of the installation; each
bomb was therefore a direct hit. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 3.
8. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 213 (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos).
See infra text accompanying notes 61-68.
9. IsraeliAttack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities.HearingsBefore the Subcomm 's on International Security and Scientc Affairs on Europe and the Middle East andon InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade ofthe House Comnt on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1981) (statement of Rep. Clement J. Zablocki). The Tamuz I attack has been one of many
incidents in a history of animosity between Israel and Iraq. It should be noted that "Iraq has
maintained a state of war with Israel since Israel was founded in 1948; Iraq has never recognized Israel's right to exist; ... Iraq has on three occasions sent military forces to participate
in a pan-Arab war against Israel." Hearings.:lsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2, at 52 (statement
of Sen. Alan Cranston). Additionally, "Iraq ... has refused to ascribe to Security Council
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ister, declared that Iraq planned to utilize this facility for the development of nuclear weapons which were to be used against Israel.' 0
The Israeli government stated that the reactor was scheduled to become operative within a few months;" destruction of the installation at a later time would have produced a fatal radioactive
fallout.'I2 Israel also emphasized that the raid was conducted on a
Sunday evening, with the intent to minimize the probability of the
presence of workers at Tamuz 1.13
On June 12, 1981, the United Nations Security Council held
an emergency session to discuss the raid.' 4 At this meeting, Dr.
Saadun Hammadi, Foreign Minister of Iraq, denounced the Israeli
attack as "a clear-cut act of premeditated aggression."' 5 Yehuda
Blum, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, also addressed
the Security Council. Ambassador Blum declared that the raid was
an act of self-preservation,' 6 and that Israel could not passively endure the "nightmare" of a pending nuclear assault by Iraq. 7
Resolutions 242 and 338, and rejected the Camp David Accords and has not played a constructive role in the peace process." Id. at 5 (statement of Walter J Stoessel, Jr., Acting
Secretary of State).
10. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 68. See also N.Y. Times, June 10, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 6.
Begin cited an October, 1980, statement which appeared in Al Thawra, an official Baghdad
newspaper. The declaration asserted that Iranians should not fear the Tamuz 1 installation,
as the reactor was intended for use against "the Zionist enemy." N.Y. Times, June 10, 198 1,
§ A, at 12, col. 5.
11. Hearings: IsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.).
See also N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 6.
12. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 75. Research has indicated that if conventional bombs
were to have destroyed Tamuz 1 when operational, the possible hazard of lethal radioactivity
in Baghdad would be "most unlikely." This information appears in an additional report by
Warren Donnelly, entitled Possible Contamination of Baghdadfrom Bombing of the Iraqi
Reactor on behalf of the Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division. This account
was also included in Hearings.- Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 156.
13. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 75. One hundred and fifty French technicians worked at
the Tamuz I installation. One French technician, Damien Chausspied, who had remained at
the reactor site on June 7, 1981, was killed as a result of the attack. N.Y. Times, June 10,
1981, § A, at 14, col. 3.
14. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 3. Iraq was a charter member of the
United Nations. See U.N. CHARTER. See also Doc. 1191, G/128, 15 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 1191
(1945). The State of Israel was created pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. See G.A. Res. 197, 3(1) U.N. GAOR, at 30-36 (1948). Israel subsequently
became a member of the United Nations on May 11, 1949. See G.A. Res. 273, 3(2) U.N.
GAOR, at 18 (1949). U.N. CHARTER, art. 34, states that "[t]he Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."
15. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 3.
16. Id.
17. Id., at 6, col. 4.
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On June 19, 1981, the United Nations Security Council
adopted a resolution which strongly condemned the Israeli raid.'"
This resolution demanded that Israel refrain from such conduct in
the future and place Israeli nuclear facilities under the safeguards
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency). 19
The Security Council also stated that Iraq was entitled to "appropriate redress" for injuries suffered.20 The resolution further recognized the right of all countries to pursue nuclear development for
peaceful purposes. 2 '
In September, 1981, The IAEA General Conference elected to
terminate immediately all technological assistance to Israel.22 Additionally, the Israeli government was requested to open al nuclear
facilities in Israel for IAEA inspection within one year. 23 Israel
failed to comply, and in September, 1982, the IAEA General Conference considered whether to suspend Israel from the Agency. 24 A
motion for Israel's suspension, which required a two-thirds majority, did not carry; a simple majority then passed a resolution not to
recognize the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the twentysixth annual session of the IAEA General Conference.25
18. 36 U.N. SCOR (2288th mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF 37 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
U.N. SCOR]. Art. 39 of the U.N. CHARTER provides that "[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain or
restore international peace and security."
19. U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981). IAEA is an acronym for the International Atomic
Energy Agency. The principal objective of the Agency is to encourage the development of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes and worldwide prosperity. The IAEA has a relationship
agreement with the United Nations. F. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
THEIR LEGAL SETTING 14 (1977). For a description of IAEA safeguards procedures, see
infra text accompanying notes 34-42.
20. U.N. SCOR, supra note 18. "Appropriate redress," in this context, meant compensation for damages inflicted by the attack. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 1.
21. U.N. SCOR, supra note 18.
22. IAEA Doc. GC (XXV)/RES/381 (1981). Israel and Iraq are both members of the
IAEA. As a prerequisite to IAEA membership, a country must be a member of either the
United Nations or a specialized agency of the United Nations. All nuclear facilities within a
member State need not be subject to Agency safeguards. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra
note 2, at 175 (statement of Myron Kratzer, International Energy Associates, Ltd., Washington, D.C.).
23. IAEA Doc. GC (XXV)/RES/381 (1981). Israel is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and is therefore not required to open Israeli nuclear installations for IAEA inspection. See infra text accompanying notes 43-50.

24. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1982, §A, at 6, cols. 4 & 5.
25. IAEA Doc. GC (XXVI)/RES/404 (1982). The IAEA General Conference convenes annually for approximately a week of meetings. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1982, § A, at 1,
col. 5. The Iraqi delegation introduced the resolution to recognize the credentials of all delegations to the 1982 session of the IAEA General Conference with the exception of the cre-
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This Comment will explore whether the Israeli attack on Iraq's
nuclear installation was justified under the principles of international law. Essential to this analysis is an understanding of the obligations incurred by States which are parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 26 The examination will
continue with an overview of nuclear developments within Iraq
and Israel. The activities of Iraq (a party to the treaty) will be contrasted with the conduct of Israel (a non-signatory of the treaty).
Israel's violation of treaty provisions and customary international
law resulting from the Tamuz 1 attack will then be addressed. A
discussion of those concepts of international law which might justify Israel's actions will follow. The role of the IAEA in the controversy and the actions which the Agency has taken against Israel
will also be considered. The analysis will reveal that the issue of
whether Israel was justified in conducting this raid involves undetermined facts. However, the threat of nuclear proliferation, as illustrated by the Tamuz 1 attack, is a problem which is capable of
resolution. A workable proposal which would combat this danger
could be achieved through the strengthening of IAEA policies and
the negotiation of an agreement among those countries with the
potential to supply assistance in the field of nuclear energy.
I.

PRELUDE TO THE TAMUZ 1 ATTACK

A4.

7he Non-ProliferationTreaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(Non-Proliferation Treaty)2 7 provides that parties to this international agreement may research, develop and utilize nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes.2 8 Those States that possess nuclear weapons
pledge not to distribute these armaments to countries which do not
have such products.2 9 The latter party nations, in turn, must agree
not to develop nuclear grade weapons.3"
Each party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is obligated to
dentials of the Israeli delegation. Id. at 6, coL. 4. This vote occurred as the 1982 session was
drawing to a close. Id. at 1, col. 5.
26. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as Non-Proliferation Treaty].
27. Id.
28. Id. art. IV.
29. Hearings.- Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 105 (statement of Dr. Herbert Kouts,
Chairman, Department of Nuclear Energy, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, N.Y.).
30. Id.
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enter into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 3 1 During the period in which this accord is negotiated, the Agency may conduct ad

hoc inspections of the nuclear facilities of the party State.32 These
investigations are virtually unlimited in terms of scope and
frequency.3 3
Once the IAEA and the party State have completed the safeguards agreement, the freedom of the Agency to examine the country's facilities is sharply curtailed. 34 Nuclear installations are

investigated a specified number of times each year by representatives of the IAEA. 35 Generally, the Agency will give several weeks'
notice prior to the inspection. 36 The nation whose facilities are to
be examined may veto the choice of individuals who have been
assigned to conduct the investigation.3 7 The inspection consists of
three tasks: (1) reviewing a list of declared materials to confirm
that the accounting balance is precise; 38 (2) measuring new, irradiated fuel;39 and, (3) completing a standard report.' An inspector
may not search for concealed operations, 4' as the purpose of the
IAEA investigation is to gather information concerning the activities of countries which have made commitments to develop peaceful uses for nuclear energy.4 2
Those States which have not ratified the Non-Proliferation
Treaty are not required to enter into safeguards agreements with
the IAEA.4 3 A nation which has not declared potential nuclear
44
capabilities is characterized as a "non-nuclear weapons State,"
31. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 26, art. III, para. 1.
32. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 169 (statement of Myron Kratzer).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 109 (statement of Roger Richter, former inspector, Middle East Region, International Atomic Energy Agency). See also N.Y. Times, June 20, 1981, § A, at 4, col. 6.
37. Hearings: IsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2, at 109 (statement of Roger Richter).
38. Id. at 110. See also N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, §A, at 18, col. I.
39. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 112 (statement of Roger Richter).
40. Id. All reports are kept confidential. Id. at 195 (statement of Rep. Edward J. Markey). See also Boffey, Nuclear Cheating: Why the Expertsare Worried,N.Y. Times, Dec. 22,
1981, § C, at 1, col. 1.
41. Hearings.-IsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2, at 110 (statement of Roger Richter). See
also N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, § A, at 18, col. 2.
42. Hearings. IsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2, at 12 (statement of Sen. John Glenn). See
also N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, § A, at 18, col. 1.
43. Hearings. Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 106 (statement of Dr. Herbert Kouts).
These countries include Israel, Argentina, Pakistan, Brazil, South Africa, China and India.
N.Y. Times, June 14, 1981, § IV, at 3, col. 4.
44. Hearings Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 151 (statement of Roger Richter).
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despite the fact that this country may indeed possess nuclear armaments.45 If such a nation were to become a party to the NonProliferation Treaty, the government would face the alternatives of

either not producing nuclear weapons or violating treaty commitments. 6 Many countries which are considered to possess nuclear
armaments have elected to avoid this choice by simply not signing
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.4 7 The decision to remain a non-

party to this international agreement is frequently
interpreted as a
48
declaration which "rings an alarm bell."
B. IsraersNuclear Development
Israel is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty4 9 and
therefore is not obligated to adhere to IAEA safeguards. ° Israel is
known to possess two nuclear installations. 5 ' IRR- 1 is a small research reactor which Israel acquired from the United States; 52 this
nuclear facility is inspected by representatives of the IAEA.5 3
Israel's second nuclear installation, Dimona, was constructed

by France. 4 Dimona is a 26-megawatt natural uranium reactor. 5

A former IAEA inspector observed, "It is likely that they [Israel]
are producing nuclear weapons there [at Dimona]. 5 6 This opinion

is substantiated by a report published by the Central Intelligence
Agency in 1978."7 This account declared that American intelligence officials had determined in 1974 that Israel had developed
45. Id.
46. Id. at 106 (statement of Dr. Herbert Kouts).
47. Id. at 151 (statement of Roger Richter).
48. Id. at 106 (statement of Dr. Herbert Kouts).
49. Id. at 3-4 (statement of Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.). See also Begin's Bombshell, N.Y.
Times, June 14, 1981, § IV, at 1, col. 1.
50. Hearings- IsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2, at 130 (statement of Roger Richter). See
also Begin's Bombshell, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1981, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
51. Hearings- IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 39 (statement of John Boright, Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs).
52. Nuclear Facilities in the Middle East, submitted by the Department of State and
included in the materials for Hearings.- IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 40 [hereinafter
cited as Nuclear Facilities].
53. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 130 (statement of Roger Richter).
54. Nuclear Facilities,supra note 52, at 40. See also N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 9,
col. 2.
55. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 40 (statement of John Boright). See
also N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 9, col. 2.
56. Hearings- IsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2, at 130 (statement of Roger Richter).
57. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 9, col. 2.
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nuclear weapons at Dimona.58 This facility is not subject to
Agency inspections,5 9 as Israel is not required to conform to IAEA

safeguards.'
C. Iraq'sNuclear Installation
As a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iraq's nuclear installations are investigated by representatives of the IAEA. 6 1 In
January, 1981, Agency inspectors visited Tamuz 1 and determined

that all nuclear material was accounted for, according to applicable

inspection guidelines.62 At the time of this investigation, Tamuz 1
was not operational, 63 and was still under construction when de-

stroyed by the Israeli raid.'
Iraq acquired Tamuz 1, a 70-megawatt Osiris-type reactor,65

pursuant to a 1975 agreement with France.66 Additionally, the
French contracted to supply Iraq with 200 kilograms of uranium,
enriched to 93 percent.67 This type of fuel is capable of producing

plutonium, a substance frequently used in the development of nuclear weapons.68 In 1978, Italy agreed to furnish Iraq with four
research laboratories. 69 The function of one laboratory, known as
the "hot cell," is to separate irradiated fuel and extract plutonium.7 °
When the United States government became aware of these
agreements, representatives of the administration attempted to dis-

suade France from supplying Iraq with highly enriched uranium.7 '
58. Id.
59. Nuclear Facilities,supra note 52, at 40.
60. Begin's Bombshell, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1981, § 4, at 1, col. 1. See also Hearings.Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 130 (statement of Roger Richter).
61. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 26, art. III, para. 1.
62. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 70. See also N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, § A, at 18, col. 2.
63. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 68.
64. Hearings.-IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.).
See also N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 6.
65. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 68.
66. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 9, col. 1.
67. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 68. Additionally, French technicians were to work at the
nuclear installation through 1989. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 1.
68. Donnelly,supra note 5, at 68. Seealso N.Y. Times, June 11, 1981, § A, at 15, col. 1.
69. Hearings.: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 110 (statement of Roger Richter). See
also N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 9, col. 2.
70. Hearings: IsraelAir Strike, supra note 2, at 110 (statement of Roger Richter). See
also N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, § A, at 18, col. 2.
71. Hearings. Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of John Boright). See
also N.Y. Times, June 11, 1981, § A, at 15, col. 1. The United States government also expressed concerns regarding the contracts between Iraq and Italy, and approached the Italian
government, as well. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 9, col. 2.
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In 1979, France offered to substitute a low-grade, enriched caramel
fuel 72 in place of the 93 percent enriched uranium originally promised.73 Iraq rejected the French proposal to alter the contract.74
Iraq has described Tamuz 1 as a "vast and ambitious program
of development."" Israel maintained that the scope of the Iraqi
project extended beyond the production of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.7 6 The United States government also "had serious misgivings regarding the ultimate character and direction of the
Iraqi nuclear program. 7 7 Members of the United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations were briefed regarding the development of Tamuz 1 in closed committee sessions. 78 Senator Howard Baker, a member of the committee, stated that the Iraqi nuclear
project had generated great concern among his colleagues in the
Senate, 79 across the United States, ° and throughout the world. 8'
As one commentator has suggested, however, these anxieties
may have been unfounded. 2 A desire to manufacture nuclear
weapons is not the only reason that a country such as Iraq would
acquire sensitive substances and sophisticated facilities. 8 3 National
pride and a desire for international recognition might motivate a
government to pursue such a program. 4 A country might develop
sources of nuclear energy in order to remain self-sufficient.8 5 The
materials might be used as educational tools in order to achieve
72. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 68. Caramel fuel is a substance with a lower enriched
uranium quality. The amount of enriched uranium is adequate to provide fuel for a nuclear
reactor, such as Tamuz I, yet is not of a degree sufficient to create nuclear weapons. N.Y.
Times, June I1, 1981, § A, at 15, col. 1.
73. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 68.
74. Hearings: IsraeliAirStrike,supra note 2, at 24 (statement of Sen. Rudy Boschwitz).
See also N.Y. Times, June 11, 1981, § A, at 15, col. 1.
75. Speech of Dr. Saadun Hammadi, Foreign Minister of Iraq, before the United Nations Security Council (June 12, 1981). Dr. Hammadi maintained that the Iraq nuclear program was devoted to peaceful purposes only. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1981, § A, at 6, col. 3.
76. See supra text accompanying note 10.
77. Hearings: Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 17 (statement of Sen. Paul Sarbanes).
See also id. at 4 (statement of Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.); N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, § A, at 9, col.
2.
78. Hearings. Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 17 (statement of Sen. Howard Baker).
79. Id
80. Id. at 18.
81. Id. See also N.Y. Times, June 19, 1981, §A, at 10, col. 2.
82. Hearings: Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 161 (statement of Albert Carnesale,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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proficiency in the field of nuclear research. 6 Additionally, surrounding circumstances might encourage a nation to develop nuclear capabilities. Iraq's enemy is believed to possess nuclear
weapons;8 7 Iraq simply might have desired to keep a weapons option available.88
The Israeli attack, however, destroyed the potential for nuclear
advancement which Iraq sought through Tamuz 1. Iraq's progress
in the field of nuclear energy has been temporarily halted. 89 At
present, the Iraqi government merely possesses a claim that Israel
violated international law on June 7, 1981.
II.

ISRAEL'S VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

A4.

TerritorialSovereignty of States

As subjects of international law, States possess certain rights
and duties which are regarded as fundamental." One such concept
is sovereignty: the entitlement of a country to self-government"
and freedom from the control of other nations, yielding only to the
dictates of international law. 92
Sovereignty encompasses several legal consequences, 93 including territorial jurisdiction, 94 which is defined as the right of the sovereign State to control all persons and objects within its territorial
limits.95 A nation may also exercise dominion over all bodies of
water located within its boundaries. 96 Finally, spatial jurisdiction
extends to the vital appendages of a country, 97 such as the
airspace.98

Airspace is comprised of the air above the territory of a na86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
Hearings. IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 161 (statement of Albert Carnesale).
France agreed to rebuild the reactor if Iraq would continue to adhere to IAEA safe-

guards.
90.
91.
92.

N.Y. Times, June 17, 1981, § A, at 18, col. 3.
H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245-46 (2d ed. 1966).
H. JACOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEXT 69 (rev. ed. 1968).
W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 89

(1979). See also H. KELSEN, supra note 90, at 250.
93. W. LEVI, supra note 92, at 89.

94. Id. at 131. Territorial jurisdiction is also known as "spatial jurisdiction."
95. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 162 (6th ed. 1963). See also H. JACOBINI supra
note 91, at 91.

96. W. LEVI, supra note 92, at 136.
97. J. FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS 63 (1968).
98. W. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL

LAW

390 (1957). The term "vi-

tal appendages" also encompasses the marginal sea. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 91.
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tion.9 9 A sovereign State possesses exclusive control over this region.1°° Consequently, a foreign aircraft' 0 1 must obtain permission
in order to enter a country's airspace. 10 2 A State may deny admitforeign aircraft might threaten natance by determining that 10the
3
tional safety or prosperity.
As a sovereign State, Iraq possesses the right to control those
persons and objects within Iraqi boundaries and airspace.'°I In destroying Tamuz 1,Israel, in effect, exercised cohtrol over a structure
located within Iraqi territory. 0 5 Iraq was therefore denied the
power to regulate all property within Iraqi boundaries." 6 Additionally, Israeli planes flew over Iraq in a surprise attack: foreign
aircrafts entered the airspace of a sovereign State without permission. 0 T Hence, Iraq was also denied the right to maintain control
over Iraqi airspace, a legal claim flowing from the right to
sovereignty. 10 8
Israel's actions were a defiance of Iraq's rights as a sovereign
State, as provided by customary international law. 109 Furthermore,
Israel violated several provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations. 110
B.

Charterof the United Nations

Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter mandates that disagreements between member States must be resolved through
Article 2(4) provides that members of the
peaceful methods.'

of any
United Nations may not violate the territorial jurisdiction
12
country through the threat or actual use of force."

99. J. FAWCETT, supra note 97, at 63.
100. Id. at 81. See also W. LEvI, supra note 92, at 129.
101. J. FAWCETr, supra note 97, at 81. This principle applies to both civil and military
aircrafts.
102. Id
103. W. GOULD, supra note 98, at 390.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
106. See supra text accompanying note 95.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 90-108.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 111-26.
111. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 3 states that "[ajll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered."
112. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 provides that "fa]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
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Israel and Iraq are both members of the United Nations."13 As
such, these countries are required to comply with the United Nations Charter." 4 In obliterating Tamuz 1, Israel did not resolve a
perceived threat through peaceful means: the launching of sixteen
2,000-pound bombs encompassed the actual use of force." 5 By entering Iraqi airspace without permission and destroying an object
located within Iraq's boundaries, Israel infringed upon Iraq's territorial jurisdiction. 16 The Israel attack would therefore be characterized as the "use of force against the territorial integrity. . . of.
. . [another] [S]tate," in violation of the Charter of the United

Nations.' '7

The United Nations Charter also states, in Article 33, that
members must utilize peaceful methods for the resolution of disagreements which might threaten international peace and secur-

ity. I I

These modes include "negotiation, inquiry, mediation,

conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of. . . [a member's]
choice.""' 9 Article 37 asserts that if these attempts prove ineffective, the problem must be called to the attention of the United Na-

tions Security Council. 120
The Israeli government's efforts to deal with the threat of Tamuz 1 through peaceful means were limited to inquiries and pro-

tests made to France regarding French promises to provide nuclear
assistance to Iraq.121 If Israel's fears could not be assauged through
the alternative methods enumerated in Article 33,122 the Israeli govical independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
113. See supra note 14.
114. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 2 mandates that "[ajll Members . . . shall fulfill in
good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."
115. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 92-108.
117. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
118. U.N. CHARTER, art. 33, para. I states that "[tihe parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all, seek a solution by. . . peaceful means ....
119. U.N. CHARTER, art. 33, para. 1.

120. U.N. CHARTER, art. 37, para. I provides: "Should the parties to a dispute... fail
to settle it. . . by the means indicated [in Article 33] ...

they shall refer it to the Security

Council."
121. Hearings.- IsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2, at 223 (statement of William T. Mallison,
Professor of Law and Director of the International and Comparative Law Program, George
Washington University, Washington, D.C.). For details of French-Iraqi agreements, see
supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
122. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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emnment had the duty to submit the problem to the United Nations
Security Council. 23 Israel, however, did not attempt to pursue this
course of action.I24 In electing to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor,
Israel did not fulfill the obligation to comply with the procedures
125
described in the Charter of the United Nations.
An examination of the applicable provisions of customary international law and the United Nations Charter indicates that
Israel acted in violation of the responsibilities incurred by sovereign States and members of the United Nations. 26 However, certain principles of customary international law and statements in the
Charter of the United Nations might justify Israel's actions.
III.

ISRAEL'S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RAID

In examining those legal theories which would justify the Tamuz 1 attack, a fundamental issue of fact remains unresolved:
whether Iraq intended to produce nuclear weapons for use against
Israel. Although the Iraqi government made commitments to the
development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 127 this country's nuclear program generated significant concern in the interna29
tional community. 28 Tamuz 1 has been destroyed;
consequently, the answer to this inquiry may be impossible to
determine.
Therefore, each alternate contingency will be considered. The
analysis will first address Israel's justification for the raid if Iraq's
objectives in acquiring Tamuz 1 included the development of nuclear weapons for use against Israel. The examination will then
proceed on the assumption that Iraq intended to utilize the reactor
solely for peaceful purposes.
A.

Tamuz 1 If Builtfor the Development of Nuclear Weapons

1. State of War. Israel has sought to justify the Tamuz 1 at123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
124. See supra text accompanying note 121. The explanation has been offered that, in
order to promote Arab views, the U.S.S.R. has frequently vetoed Security Council resolu-

tions. Israel therefore considers United Nations Security Council procedures ineffective in
protecting Israeli interests. Hearings: Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 247 (statement of
John N. Moore, Walter L. Brown Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law and National Security, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 111-24.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 90-125.
127. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
128. See supra text accompanying note 81.
129. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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tack by contending that Iraq and Israel were in a state of war on
June 7, 1981.130 If these countries were, in fact, in a state of war at
that time, Israel was bound to adhere to those principles of international law which apply to nations at war.13' In order to determine
whether the state of war premise would justify the Tamuz 1 attack,
two issues must be resolved. First, did a state of war prevail between Israel and Iraq on June 7, 1981? Second, if a state of war did
exist between these nations, did the Israeli raid conform to those
regulations which govern the conduct of States during a time of
war?
The temporal scope of a state of war is delineated by the commencement and the termination of war, which is defined as "a condition of armed and/or formal hostility between states."' 132 In
1907, the Hague Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities
mandated two methods through which nations might enter into a
state of war. 133 First, a State might officially declare war upon another country. 34 Second, a nation might deliver an ultimatum announcing that the alternative to compliance would be war. 35 In
actuality, additional modes of commencing war have been acknowledged: a country might either proclaim that the conduct of
another nation has resulted in a state of war or commit hostile acts
with the intent to wage war.' 36 The universal acknowledgment that
Israel and Iraq have fought as adversaries in numerous wars may
be interpreted as sufficient manifestation of the hostile acts required
137
to create a state of war.
The crucial inquiry is therefore whether a state of war between
130. Hearings: IsraeiAirStrike, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.).
13 1. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 295. See generaly W. LEvI, supra note 92, at 325: -It
may appear paradoxical that war for most states as members of the United Nations is no
longer permitted, yet rules of war continue in force."
132. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 278.
133.

G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 559-60 (2d ed. 1970).

134. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 284.
135. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 133, at 560. In the case of an ultimatum, a State will
present a demand to another country, and will generally give a time limit for a response.
136. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 284.

137. See, e.g., H. SICHERMAN, The Yom Kippur War." End of Illusion?, 4 FOREIGN POL'Y
PAPERS (1976).

See also H. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL Dis-

PUTES 278-83 (1975) for recognition that Iraq participated in wars with Israel, and H.
SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL 327-28, 642, 771 (1976) for Israeli acknowledgment. For
detailed descriptions of Iraqi involvement in the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, see FACTS
ON FILE, INC., ISRAEL & THE ARABS: THE JUNE 1967 WAR 66-74 (1968), and E.
O'BALLANCE, THE THIRD ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 75-76 (1972). See C. HERZOG, THE WAR OF

ATONEMENT 135-43 (1975) for specifics of Iraq's role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
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Iraq and Israel terminated before June 7, 1981. According to customary international law, a state of war may be ended through one
of three methods: (1) a treaty of peace; (2) subjugation; or, (3) a

cessation of hostilities. 138

The most common manner through which to terminate war is
the peace treaty.' 39 This document returns the parties to a state of
peace 40 and resolves all remaining disputes between the countries.' 4 1 Iraq and Israel have never signed a peace treaty.' 42 Therefore, the two
nations have not ended a state of war through a treaty
43
of peace.1
In order to terminate a state of war through subjugation, a
country must obliterate the enemy's status as a sovereign State.'44
Israel and Iraq both exist as sovereign States; 45 therefore, a state of
war between these nations has not ceased through subjugation .246
Finally, a state of war may end through a cessation of hostilities: the governments may issue a proclamation stating that the nations are no longer at war, 47 or the countries may simply stop
fighting. 148 If a state of war is terminated on this basis, each State
49
will retain the property occupied at the time that hostilities cease '
Neither Iraq nor Israel has announced that the two countries are no
longer at war; on the contrary, both nations have declared that a
state of war continues to exist. 50 Israel and Iraq had, in fact, sus138. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 133, at 572.
139. W. GOULD, supra note 98, at 663. The peace treaty is the typical and most preferable method of ending war. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 133, at 576.
140. H. JACOBINI, Supra note 91, at 287.
141. W. GOULD, supra note 98, at 663.
142. Hearings.-IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 241 (statement of John N. Moore).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 137-42.
144. 2 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARMED CONFLICT 730 (1968).
"'Subjugation' means the firm military conquest of the enemy state following deballatio, the
disintegration and eventual disappearance of its government, and the total absence of organized resistance by citizens and soldiers of the defeated state." G. VON GLAHN, supra note
133, at 572-73.
145. U.N. CHARTER, art. 4, para. I states: -[m]embership in the United Nations is open
to all . . . peace loving states .. " Israel and Iraq are both members of the United Nations, and therefore exist as sovereign States. See supra note 14. See also supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
147. W. GOULD, supra note 98, at 662.
148. Id. at 661. The requisite duration of this time period is not absolute. H. JACOBINI,
supra note 91, at 287.
149. H. JACOBINI, Supra note 91, at 287.
150. See Hearings.- Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Walter J. Stoessel,
Jr.) for Israeli assertion that Iraq and Israel are in a state of war. See id. at 52 (statement of
Sen. Alan Cranston) for similar declarations by Iraq. See also supra note 9.
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pended fighting for a substantial time period.'' However, the
existence of a cessation of hostilities must be determined with regard to surrounding circumstances.' 5 2 Israel and Iraq have frequently stated that the two nations are at war. 5 3 These
pronouncements indicate that hostilities between these countries
were merely dormant, 5 4 and that a cessation of hostilities had not
occurred on June 7, 1981.'"1 Iraq and Israel, by asserting that a
state of war prevailed, have met the essential requirement for war"a condition of formal hostility."'' 56 Under the principles of international law, Israel and Iraq were therefore in a state of war on
June 7, 1981.1.7
The second issue which must be addressed is whether Israel
conformed to those regulations which govern countries at war.' 58
The rules of war utilize three techniques to distinguish between
lawful and unlawful conduct: ratione loci (the distinction between
places), 9 ratione instrumenti (the distinction between weapons)' 6°
and rationepersonae(the distinction between persons).' 6' In order
to adhere to the regulations of war, a State must conform to the
principles established in each category.' 6 2
The first classification, raione loci, indicates that certain geo151. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 10 (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar).
152. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 287.
153. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
154. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 10 (statement of John Boright).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 151-54.
156. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 178. See also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 132-56.
158. Although many rules of war have been codified (see, e.g., Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907), these documents are not comprehensive. J. FAWCETr, supra note 97, at 131.
Many codified rules have become archaic due to modern technology and have not been
updated. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 133, at 583. Regulations of war in the air have not
been successfully codified. Id. at 594-96. The Hague Convention IV with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention IV] stated, in the preamble, that general principles of international law which have evolved through customary use and ideals of humanitarianism should
govern those situations which are not controlled by the Convention. These concepts are
applied to warfare in the air. W. LEVI, supra note 92, at 326. However, the various forms of
war (land, air, and sea) have increasingly tended to interrelate. Id. Therefore, this Comment will apply relevant treaty provisions, by analogy, in instances where customary international law is silent.
159. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra note 144, at 109. See also G. Vo N GLAHN, supra
note 133, at 590.
160. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra note 144, at 109. See also W. LEVI, supra note 92, at
327.
161. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra note 144, at 110. See also H. JACOBINI, supra note
91, at 302.
162. G. SCHWARTZENBEROER, supra note 144, at 109.
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graphical areas and structures are excluded from the zones of
war.16 3 The lawful scope of combat is limited to the land and
marine territory of the countries engaged in war, the high seas, and
the airspace above these regions." 4 In addition, certain property
must remain intact. 65 An enemy nation must strive to protect
"buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes
. . .provided. . . [these buildings] are not being used at the same
time for military purposes."' 166 A nuclear installation such as Tamuz 1 would be characterized as a structure "dedicated to. . .science." 167 If Iraq had acquired this reactor in order to produce
nuclear weapons, the facility would have been "used at the same
time for military purposes."' 16 Tamuz 1 therefore would not have
been protected by the rationeloci
distinction and would have been
69
a lawful target for destruction.
The ratione instrumenhi classification outlaws the use of those
weapons which produce needless suffering.' 7° The sole dispute regarding the armaments which Israel used in the Tamuz 1 attack has
centered on whether conventional bombs or precision-guided
bombs were utilized. 171 Reports of these discussions do not consider whether either type of weapons would have been proscribed
by the ratione instrumenti requirements. 172 Therefore, there is not
enough information to make this issue a sufficient area for inquiry.
Finally, the rationepersonaedistinction mandates that warfare
should be waged among combatants: 73 a country should not in163. Id. See also H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 314.
164. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 133, at 590.
165. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra note 144, at 112.

166. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 314. See Hague Convention IV, supra note 158, art.
27.
167. See supra note 166.
168. Id.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 163-68.

170. G.

SCHWARTZENBERGER,

supra note 144, at 109. See also H.

JACOBINI,

supra note

91, at 313.
171. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 3. See also Two Minutes Over Baghdad,
NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1981, at 23.
172.
N.Y. Times, June 10, 198 1, § A, at 12, col. 3. Conventional bombs were customarily used in World War II. 4 C. WEBSTER & N. FRANKLAND, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY 1939-1945, at 30-36 (1961).
Precision bombs are more

sophisticated weapons which provide guidance systems and tend to avoid indiscriminate destruction. R. PRANGER & D. TAHTIEN, IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1976 ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY
STATUS 20-21, 36-37 (1976). If conventional bombs, which operate indiscriminately, are not
deemed illegal, then bombs with guidance systems which do not operate as indiscriminately
would also not be prohibited under the ratione instrumenti classification.
173. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra note 144, at 110. Two additional classifications in
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volve non-combatants in hostilities.' 74 An exception applies to
those non-combatants who are situated within the proximity of belligerent operations.' 75 These individuals are subject to the same
risks as combatants. 7 6 If Iraq intended to utilize Tamuz 1 in order
to develop nuclear weapons, then the reactor, a military installation, would have been a lawful target for the Israeli attack. 177 One
non-combatant, a French technician at the reactor site, was killed
in the raid. 7 8 As a civilian in the vicinity of a belligerent operation, this individual was not entitled to the special protection which
international law generally provides to non-combatants.' 79 8Israel
0
therefore did not violate the rationepersonae requirements. 1
Assuming that Iraq's goals for Tamuz 1 included the production of nuclear weapons, the Israeli attack conformed to the rules of
war: Israel destroyed a lawful target, sought to minimize the casualties of those individuals in the vicinity of the installation and utilized weapons which were not deemed illegal.' 8 ' If a state of war
did not, in fact, exist between Israel and Iraq on June 7, 1981, Israel
could attempt to justify the raid on an alternative theory: selfdefense.
2. Self-Defense. Assuming that Iraq's goals for Tamuz 1 included the production of nuclear weapons for use against Israel, the
principle of self-defense might also justify the Israeli attack. Selfdefense is described as "the forcible rejection of an illegal existing
or impending interference, usually by force, with a [S]tate's
rights."' 8 2 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states:
"[niothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
83
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs." 1
The elements of the right of self-defense are not enumerated in the
the rationepersonae category become operative if an individual is found on enemy territory:
the distinctions "between members of armed forces and civilians and between lawful and
unlawful combatants."
174. 2 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, PART 1:INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GENERAL 160 (1975). A military attack may not be directed toward a civilian population. See
also W. GOULD, supra note 98, at 643.
175. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra note 144, at 115.
176. Id.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 163-69.
178. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 173-79.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 159-80.
182. W. LEVI, supra note 92, at 314.
183. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
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law,
Charter of the United Nations. 8 4 Customary international
85
principle.'
this
of
definition
a
provides
however,
Customary international law specifies the following requirements for the legitimate use of self-defense. First, the State must be
the target of the hostile activities of another country. 86 Second, the
defending nation must reasonably decide that some force is neces87
sary in order to maintain the inherent right of sovereignty.
Third, the degree of force utilized in exercising the right of selfdefense must be proportionate to the needs of the defending
nation.188
According to customary international law, the first element of
the right to self-defense was fulfilled if the defending State were the
target of an actual or impending attack. 8 9 Thus, anticipatory selfdefense (the use of force to prevent an impending attack) was recognized as legitimate. 90 The United Nations Charter, however,
mandates that States may invoke the right of self-defense "if an
armed attack occurs."'' The question of whether Article 51 perself-defense has been an issue of extensive
mits anticipatory
92
controversy. 1
The restrictive interpretation of Article 51 would limit the exercise of self-defense to those situations in which an armed attack
had actually occurred.' 9 3 The United Nations Charter explicitly
permits self-defense "if an armed attack occurs."' 19 4 Article 51 is
silent on the issue of whether the right of self-defense may be in195
yoked in the face of threatened aggression by another country.
Furthermore, the United Nations Charter authorizes members to
184. Id
185. See infra text accompanying notes 186-88.
186. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 59798 (1936), reprinted in 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 973 (1965).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. THOMAS & THOMAS, THE HAMMARSKJOLD FORUMS: THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 193
(1967) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS].
CRISIS 1965 (1967), reprinted in

190.

H. JACOBINI, mupra note 91, at 70. See also THOMAS, supra note 189, at 193.

191.

See supra text accompanying note 183.

192.

H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 70.

193. THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION 123-24 (1956), reprinted in

5

M. WHITE-

MAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 987 (1965) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS & THOMAS].
See also H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 70-71.
194. See supra text accompanying note 183.
195.

See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
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exercise the "inherent right" of self-defense. 196 According to customary international law, the "inherent" right of self-defense is described as the power to take action against an actual attack. 197 Selfdefense measures which are launched as a result of threatened aggression are characterized as "permissive."' 98 Article 51 does not
provide that a member State may exercise general powers of selfdefense, nor does the Charter mention the permissive right of selfdefense: a member is authorized to invoke the "inherent" right of
self-defense."" This limited interpretation of Article 51 would
therefore permit a State to act in self-defense only if an actual assault had occurred.2 °° Israel destroyed Tamuz 1 in response to a
perceived threat, as Iraq had not attacked Israel. 20 ' Therefore,
within the confines of this interpretation of Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, Israel was not entitled to exercise the right of selfdefense. 2
The prevailing interpretation of Article 51 would permit member States to act in anticipatory self-defense.2 "3 The negotiating
history of the Charter of the United Nations supports this position .2 ° Additionally, the French text of Article 51 describes
"armed attack" as "aggression arm~e," encompassing the concepts
of both actual and threatened armed attacks. 2 5 The right of anticipatory self-defense is also substantiated by numerous legal precedents.2 '° Moreover, one must consider the right of self-defense
196.
197.
198.
199.

See supra text accompanying note 183.
THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 193, at 987.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 183.

200. H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (7th ed. 1952), reprinted
in 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 987 (1965).

201. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 240 (statement of John N. Moore).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 193-20 1.
203. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 71. See also Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note
2, at 220 (statement of William T. Mallison), and at 238 (statement of John N. Moore).
204. Hearings. lsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2, at 220 (statement of William T. Mallison).
205. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 71. See also Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note
2, at 220 (statement of William T. Mallison).
206. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 71. See also Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note
2, at 221 (statement of William T. Mallison), citing the Caroline case. In 1837, the British
destroyed the Caroline, an American ship which supplied insurgent Canadians with armaments during the Canadian rebellion against Great Britain. The legal doctrine of self-defense was first introduced in correspondence connected with the Caroline case, in which the
British raid was justified as a precautionary measure in order to prevent future attacks. See
Jennings, The CarolineandMacLead Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82-92 (1938). Professor Mallison also discussed two fairly recent examples of legitimate anticipatory self-defense. One
incident occurred during World War II, after Germany and the Vichy Government of
France had agreed to an armistice. Great Britain, concerned that German forces would
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against the backdrop of modem technology:2 07 a defending State

may be obliterated by the enemy's first strike.20 8
According to the prevailing interpretation of Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, a member State is permitted to exercise
the right of self-defense if threatened with an impending attack.2 °9
If Iraq intended to utilize nuclear weapons produced at Tamuz 1
against Israel, then Israel would have been the target of an armed
attack. Therefore, the first element required in order to invoke the
right of self-defense would have been present. 2 m0
The second component of the legitimate exercise of self-defense is necessity: the act of self-defense must be the sole recourse
available to the defending State. 2 " Aside from communications
with France, Israel did not attempt to deal with the threat of an
Iraqi attack through diplomatic channels. 2 2 Although peaceful

means for resolution of the problem may have proven ineffective, 21 3 the necessity element of self-defense requires that the defending nation must first exhaust all viable alternatives before

resorting to the use of force. 214 Israel failed to adhere to this obligation and therefore did not satisfy the necessity demand of legitimate self-defense.2 1 5
In order to conform to the third element of self-defense, which
is proportionality, the defending State's actions must not be excessive 2 16 and must be terminated once the self-defense needs are fulutilize French warships, declared that the vessels would be destroyed unless the French
would either incorporate these ships into the British Navy or demilitarize the crafts. The
French commander in Oran (North Africa) refused to comply with either alternative, and
Great Britain carried out the ultimatum. The British destruction of the French vessels was
regarded as lawful: commentators generally agreed that the British were not required to
postpone an attack until the French vessels were transformed into German warships. Additionally, many international lawyers advocated the destruction of Cuban missile sites, during
the Cuban Missile Crisis, as a legitimate exercise of anticipatory self-defense. President Kennedy, however, utilized alternative means to eliminate the perceived danger.
207. H. JACOBINI, supra note 91, at 71.
208. BowETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-92 (1958), reprintedin 5 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 989 (1965).

209. See supra text accompanying notes 203-08.
210. See supra text accompanying note 186.
211. W. LEVI, supra note 92, at 315.
212. See supra text accompanying note 121.

213. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
214. Id. See also W. LEVI, supra note 92, at 315; Hearings.- IsraeliAir Strike, supra note

2, at 223 (statement of William T. Mallison).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 211-14.
216. THOMAS, supra note 189.
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filled.2" 7 The scope of the Israeli raid was confined precisely to the
site of Tamuz 1, and the attack was completed within two minutes.2 18 In limiting the bombing to the swift destruction of the
21 9 Israel conformed to the
source of the 22threat,
principle of
0
proportionality.
Despite the fact that Iraq may have intended to develop nuclear weapons for use against Israel, the Israeli raid could not be
justified as a legitimate act of self-defense. By disregarding peaceful methods for resolution of the threat of an Iraqi attack, Israel's
actions did not satisfy the standard of necessity required for the
lawful exercise of self-defense. 22' A more effective argument for
Israel to advance would be that Iraq and Israel were in a state of
war and that the Israeli raid conformed to the rules of war.22 2
B.

Tamuz 1: If Builtfor Peaceful Purposes

1. State of War. Assuming that Iraq intended to utilize Tamuz I solely for peaceful purposes, and further assuming that a
state of war existed between Israel and Iraq on June 7, 198 1,223 the
rules of war would be applied in analyzing the Israeli attack on
Iraq's reactor. A former IAEA inspector noted that French technicians remained at Tamuz 1 "except perhaps during a period of military operations." 224 This statement reveals that Tamuz 1 was at
times used for military purposes. Additionally, French technicians
and Iraqi military personnel may have worked simultaneously at
the installation. The fact that a French technician was at the site of
the facility during the raid does not preclude the possibility that
military operations were conducted at Tamuz 1.225 The question of
whether the reactor was used for military as well as scientific purposes on June 7, 1981, is an unanswered issue of fact.226
The ratione loci distinction 227 mandates that a scientific edifice
is not a lawful enemy target unless the building is simultaneously
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 203-09.
See supra text accompanying notes 216-19.
See supra text accompanying notes 211-15.

222. See supra text accompanying notes 130-81.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 132-57.
224. Hearings.- IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 131 (statement of Roger Richter).

225. Hearings: IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 131 (statement of Roger Richter). See
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
226.

See supra text accompanying note 224.

227. See supra text accompanying note 163.
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used for military purposes.2 2 8 If military and scientific operations
were concurrently conducted at Tamuz 1, then the reactor would
have been a lawful target:2 29 the ratione loci classification does not
extend protection to a scientific structure which is also utilized for
military activities.2 30 Additionally, Israel would have complied
with the rat/onepersonaedistinction: the casualty, a non-combatant, was within the proximity of military operations. 3
In the alternative, if the installation did not maintain a connection with Iraq's military forces, then Tamuz 1 would have been a
building devoted to science and, therefore, protected property. 232
Israel would also have had a duty not to kill the French technician:
as a civilian in the vicinity of an unlawful target, this individual
warranted the protection afforded to non-combatants. 233
If Tamuz 1 did not provide a site for Iraqi military affairs on
June 7, 198 1, Israel would be unable to justify the attack by asserting that Israeli actions conformed to the rules of war.23 4 Conversely, if military operations were conducted at the installation,
235
Israel might successfully argue that the raid was justified.
2. Se/f-Defense. In order to exercise the right of self-defense,
the defending country must be the target of the belligerent conduct
of another country. 236 Assuming Tamuz 1 was constructed solely
for peaceful purposes, Israel would not have been the object of
Iraqi aggression. Israel would therefore lack a basis for any claims
of self-defense.2 37
The Israeli raid would be difficult to justify if Iraq intended to
utilize Tamuz 1 exclusively for peaceful operations. 3 8 When the
IAEA considered the ramifications of the Tamuz 1 attack, the
Agency operated on the assumption that Iraq did not intend to produce nuclear weapons for use against Israel. 239 The IAEA concluded that the Israeli raid caused "considerable damage to the
safeguards regime and could seriously jeopardize the development
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra text accompanying note 166.
See supra text accompanying notes 225-28.
See supra text accompanying note 166.
See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
See supra text accompanying note 166.
See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
See supra text accompanying notes 227-28 and 232-33.
See supra text accompanying notes 227-31.
See supra text accompanying note 186.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 223-37.
See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
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of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," and elected to take actions against Israel. 24°
IV.

THE ROLE OF THE IAEA

As a member of the IAEA, Israel must comply with the dictates of the Agency's Charter. 4 Article XIX of the IAEA Charter
declares that a member which violates the provisions of the Charter
may be denied the privileges and rights of membership in the
Agency.242 Two questions therefore arise. First, did Israel violate
the terms of the IAEA Charter? Second, did the Agency adhere to
the Charter in taking actions against Israel?
The IAEA Charter enumerates several Agency objectives.
These aspirations include the research and development of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes 243 and the administration of safeguards in nuclear facilities. 2' In obliterating Tamuz 1, Israel prevented Iraq from using this facility for the production of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. 245 The IAEA Charter encourages the
240. IAEA Doc. GC(XXV)/RES/381 (1981). The IAEA General Conference based
these decisions on several factors, including the fact that Iraq has suscribed to IAEA safeguards procedures, while Israel has repeatedly refused to open unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear
facilities for IAEA inspection. The Agency also referred to a resolution adopted by the IAEA
Board of Governors on June 12, 1981, which "strongly condemned" Israel for the attack and
recommended that the General Conference "consider all implications of the attack, including suspending the exercise by Israel of the privileges and rights of membership." IAEA
Doc. GC (XXV)/643 (1981). The General Conference also cited the United Nations Security Council's condemnation of the raid. See U.N. SCOR, supra note 18.
241. IAEA CHARTER, art. IV, sec. C states that "[tihe Agency is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its members, and all members, in order to ensure to all of them
the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with this Statute."
242. IAEA CHARTER, art. XIX, sec. B mandates that: "[a] member which has persistently
violated the provisions of this Statute or of any agreement entered into by it pursuant to this
Statute may be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership by
the General Conference. . .voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors."
243. IAEA CHARTER, art. III, sec. A states that "[tihe Agency is authorized: I. To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy
for peaceful uses .. "
244. The IAEA Charter also provides:
A. The Agency is authorized:
5. To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information
made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control
are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or
at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic
energy. ...
IAEA CHARTER, art. Ill,
sec. A, para. 5.
245. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1983

23

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1983], Art. 12
TAMUZ

I

pursuit of this goal.2 46 Furthermore, it has been interpreted that in
destroying this safeguarded installation, Israel communicated the
belief that the IAEA safeguards system could not adequately assure

247
the development of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.

Such a position would run counter to Israel's obligation to support
the safeguards system of the Agency.2 48 In frustrating the development of nuclear energy and disaffirming the administration of safeguards, Israel violated the IAEA Charter.2 4 9
As a result of Israel's defiance of the Agency's Charter, the
General Conference had the power, as provided in Article XIX, to
deny Israel the rights and privileges of membership. 25° This plenary body elected to terminate all technological assistance to Israel
as of September, 1981, and refused to recognize the credentials of
the Israeli delegation to the twenty-sixth annual session of the General Conference in September, 1982.251 Both the status of having
credentials recognized by the IAEA and the ability to receive assist-

ance from the Agency can be characterized as "privileges and rights
of membership. 2 5 2 The General Conference, therefore, expressly
followed the terms of the IAEA Charter in electing to take these
actions against Israel.25 3
A poignant aspect of the resolution of the General Conference
246. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
247. Hearings: IsraeliAir Sirike, supra note 2, at 12 (statement of Sen. John Glenn).
Senator Glenn observed that the Israeli raid represented "the first gigantic vote of no confidence in the international non-proliferation regime, including the IAEA safeguards."
248. See supra notes 241 & 244 and accompanying text.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 241-48.
250. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. For details of IAEA procedures for recognition of credentials, see Rules of Procedure of the General Conference, Rules 27-29,
IAEA Doc. GC (XIX)/INF/152, at 10-11. The IAEA General Conference first utilized the
practice of withdrawing credentials in 1979. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1982, § A, at 6, col. 4. In
that year, this plenary body resolved not to accept the credentials of the South African delegates to the Agency's twenty-third annual General Conference Session. IAEA Doc. GC
(XXIII)/OR/21 1,paras. 21-26. The IAEA was one of several international organizations
which refused to recognize the status of delegates from South Africa. See F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 98-99 (1981 Supp.). Generally, reso-

lutions to reject credentials remain in effect only for the duration of the current session; a
new resolution, in the subsequent annual meeting, would be required to invalidate the credentials of a delegation for the following year. Id. For example, the rejection of the credentials of the Israeli delegation remained operative merely during the September 1982 meetings
of the twenty-sixth annual IAEA General Conference. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1982, § A, at 6,
col. 5. This resolution was among the final measures adopted as the week-long 1982 session
neared completion. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1982, § A, at 1,col. 5.
252.

IAEA CHARTER, art. XIX, sec. B. See supra note 242.

253. See supra text accompanying notes 251-52.
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in September, 1981, was the demand that the Israeli government
open all nuclear facilities in Israel for IAEA inspection.2 5 4 The
Agency emphasized the significance of the IAEA safeguards regime, yet Iraq's safeguarded facilities generated anxieties throughout the world. 255 Critics have argued that the current safeguards
system contains numerous loopholes and is therefore ineffective in
eliminating the threat of nuclear proliferation.25 6 Commentators
have also maintained that even the most comprehensive safeguards
regime would be insufficient to control this danger.25 7 Proposals to
eliminate the threat of nuclear proliferation should be considered
in light of these opinions.
V.

PROPOSAL

The Israeli raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor has presented two
problems for resolution. The first is the issue of whether the principles of international law justify the Tamuz 1 attack. The answer to
this query is dependent upon unknown facts and, therefore, a conclusive determination of this dispute cannot be reached. The second question concerns the underlying problem of the Israeli raid;
specifically, what action can be taken in order to eliminate the
threat of nuclear proliferation?
A.

Obstacles to UniversalApproaches

The threat of nuclear proliferation is omnipresent; therefore, a
solution which would effectively erradicate this danger would necessarily involve all countries in the international community. Any
approach which would be universally applied, whether simplistic or
complex, would pose several obstacles.
For example, commentators have suggested that in order to
eliminate the threat of nuclear proliferation, all fuel with the capacity to produce nuclear-grade weapons should be placed under international ownership.25 8 Several countries are currently attempting
to establish such a regime through the IAEA. 25 9 In order to obtain
254. See supra text accompanying note 23.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
256. Hearings: IsraelAirStrike, supra note 2, at 129 (statement of Roger Richter). See
also id. at 195 (statement of Sen. Rudy Boschwitz); id. at 22 (statement of Sen. Alan
Cranston).
257. Boffey, supra note 40, at 1, col. 1. See also Hearings:IsraeliAirStrike, supra note 2,
at 162 (statement of Albert Carnesale).
258. Hearings. IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2 at 160 (statement of Albert Carnesale).
259. Id.
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highly enriched uranium or plutonium, a country would have the
burden of demonstrating in advance a legitimate need for the
materials. 260 All documents and reports concerning the use of plutonium and enriched uranium would be published.2"6 '
A more elementary suggestion would be that all countries
should ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Parties to this treaty
are required to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.2 62
Consequently, all nations would be obligated not to use nuclear
energy in futherance of the production of nuclear weapons.
Although the ratification of a treaty appears to be far less burdensome an undertaking than the former project, these alternatives
share a problem which is threefold. First, any universal agreement
of this sort is entered into on a voluntary basis. Although an international organization or various foreign governments may recommend that a particular State become a party to such a project, the
ultimate decision rests with each country. Some nations might not
wish to make commitments which would legally foreclose all options. A case in point is Israel's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.2 63
Second, even those States which would approve such a universal approach actually would possess an alternative: a nation might
elect to violate this accord. Therefore, the threat of nuclear
proliferation would not be eliminated through the endorsement of
an agreement.
Third, problems might also arise if a nation were to adhere to
treaty obligations. Surrounding circumstances might lead other
countries to believe that a particular State is violating international
commitments. These countries might perceive the threat of nuclear
proliferation, despite the fact that no such danger actually exists.
The Iraqi nuclear project presents an ideal scenario through
which the latter two obstacles can be illustrated. Iraq would have
been violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty by preparing to develop nuclear weapons. In that case, the second shortcoming would
have been manifested. In the alternative, if Iraq actually were adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and did not intend to produce such armaments, the Iraqi nuclear program, nevertheless,
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-49.
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generated tremendous concern throughout the world. 2 64 The third
obstacle would then have become operative, as the threat of nuclear
proliferation would not have been eliminated. Despite these shortcomings, however, the suggested universal approaches remain goals
which should not be discarded.
B. A Workable Proposalat The Present Time
Although definitive solutions for the elimination of the threat
of nuclear proliferation might not currently exist, some action must
be taken to reduce this problem. The following proposal consists of
three components. The first two sections concern changes within
the IAEA system, and the third segment involves cooperation
among individual nations.
Commentators have noted that despite various flaws, the
IAEA safeguards regime is an extremely useful system and should
not be abandoned.2 65 Safeguards should continue to exist, yet the
scope of this program must be developed in two respects.
First, all countries which receive technological aid from the
IAEA would be required to adhere to Agency safeguards. Under
the current regime, member States (such as Israel) which were not
subject to comprehensive IAEA safeguards could nevertheless
qualify for assistance from the Agency.2 66 The proposed agreements between the IAEA and these nations would be negotiated on
a quidpro quo 267 basis. The State would receive technological aid
in return for opening all nuclear facilities for Agency investigation.
Second, the actual inspections must be far more extensive than
current procedures. At present, countries enjoy considerable freedom in controlling the parameters of the examination process, including the time and frequency of inspections, the selection of
inspectors, and the areas within the facility to be inspected.2 68 This
264. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
265. Hearings.- IsraeliAir Strike, supra note 2, at 161 (statement of Albert Carnesale).
Mr. Carnesale concluded, "There is one message I want to leave with you: Do not throw out
the baby with the bath water. . . . There is room for improvement of safeguards but because they are not perfect in some kinds of facilities, let us not badmouth them too much and
find ourselves without them."
266. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Israel received technological aid from
the IAEA until the General Conference resolved to terminate assistance to Israel in September, 1981.
267. Quidpro quo is defined as: "What for what; something for something. Used in law
for the giving one valuable thing for another," reprintedin BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123
(5th ed. 1979).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
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proposal would expand these procedures to encompass "roaming
rights," whereby inspectors could visit nuclear installations at any
time, with all parts of the reactors open to investigation.2 69 Inspections would also occur more frequently 270 and inspectors would initiate surprise visits. A State would not have the power to veto the
choice of IAEA representatives who are to examine the nuclear facilities. The Agency would select independent and disinterested inspectors who would conduct fair and impartial investigations.
Additionally, all inspection reports would be published.2 7 '
Finally, those nations which have the potential to provide nuclear assistance must negotiate an agreement. This accord would
establish criteria for providing a recipient State with materials and
technology. Naturally, all potential supplier nations might not
elect to become parties to such an agreement. A lack of absolute
participation, however, is not a sufficient reason to oppose the negotiation of this accord. Any degree of involvement will, at least,
reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, the ramifications of continued unrestricted sales could be catastrophic.
The threat of nuclear proliferation is actual and acute. As
countries continue to supply nuclear materials and technological
assistance without strict limitations, the threat of nuclear proliferation will increase. As the supply of nuclear weapons intensifies, all
nations may one day face the horror of nuclear destruction.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The construction of Tamuz 1, Iraq's 70-megawatt nuclear reactor, engendered worldwide concern. 27 2 Representatives of the
IAEA who inspected this facility concluded that Iraq conformed to
the safeguards agreement which this nation had negotiated with the
Agency.27 3 Israel, however, declared that Iraq intended to develop
nuclear weapons at this installation.27 4 On June 7, 1981, Israel obliterated Tamuz 1.275
Various legal principles and treaty commitments determine
whether the Israeli attack violated international law. By flying in
Iraqi airspace and destroying an object situated within Iraq's
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Hearings: Israeli Air Strike, supra note 2, at 177 (statement of Sen. John Glenn).
Id. at 160 (statement of Albert Carnesale).
Id. at 177 (statement of Sen. John Glenn).
See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
See supra text accompanying note 62.
See supra text accompanying note 10.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
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boundaries, Israel denied Iraq the fundamental right of a sovereign
State to maintain territorial jurisdiction.27 6 As a member of the
United Nations, Israel did not comply with the obligation to resolve disputes with other countries through peaceful methods.2 77
Two concepts of international law might justify Israel's actions. The analysis of these issues, however, is dependent upon the
question of whether Iraq planned to produce nuclear weapons at
the installation.2 78 Assuming that Iraq intended to develop nuclear
weapons, the Tamuz 1 attack could be justified by the theory that
Israel was in a state of war with Iraq and complied with the rules of
war. 27 9 An alternative contention, the legitimate exercise of selfdefense, would not be as persuasive. Israel, in failing to pursue
peaceful means of settlement, would be unable to demonstrate the
necessity of resorting to the use of such force. 2 0 Assuming that
Iraq intended to utilize the reactor for peaceful purposes only,
Israel would again fail to justify the attack on the grounds of selfdefense, as Israel would not have been the target of Iraqi nuclear
activity. 281 Furthermore, Israel could successfully argue adherence
to the rules of war only if Tamuz 1 was simultaneously used for
scientific and military operations.2 82 However, this analysis has
been based on assumptions of unknown facts; an absolute conclusion, therefore, cannot be determined.
The practical implications of the Tamuz 1 attack, which are
capable of resolution, concern the threat of nuclear proliferation.
The IAEA acted within its authority in electing to impose sanctions
upon Israel.28 3 Solutions to the threat of nuclear proliferation
which would involve universal commitments are recognized as
goals for which to strive.284 A workable proposal to reduce the
threat of nuclear proliferation at the present time would consist of:
(1) requiring that all nations which receive IAEA assistance open
nuclear facilities for Agency inspection; 285 (2) strengthening the
IAEA safeguards system;2 86 and, (3) establishing criteria for pro276.
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viding recipient countries with sensitive materials and technological
assistance. The proposed scheme is aimed toward the prevention of
a future Tamuz 1 episode.
Joanne E. Birnberg
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